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LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL HURDLES TO
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
THE STATE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(AND ARGUMENTS FOR SCALING THEM)
PennyJ. White"
No institution ofgovernment can now afford to ignore the rest of the world. The
fates ofnations are more closely intertwined than ever before."
INTRODUCTION

Legal, political, and ethical hurdles that affect the application of
international human rights law' in American state courts are often
incomprehensible to our international neighbors 2 as well as to practicing
attorneys whose practices have not previously involved international law
issues. The purpose of this Article is two-fold. The first purpose is to
summarize,3 for our international neighbors, some of the more
formidable hurdles that complicate the application of international
human rights law in the state courts. The Article's second purpose is to
offer to the practicing attorney not versed in international law some
arguments for scaling the hurdles.
In Section I, the Article reviews the framework in which these issues
arise, the American dual system of state and federal government. Constitutional principles are discussed in simple terms. Next, the Article discusses legal hurdles to the application of international human rights law4

* Associate Professor ofl-aw, University of Tennessee College of Law. The author thanks Anne

James of the International Justice Project, Professor Barbara Stark of the University of Tennessee College
of Lmv, ProfessorJames Coleman of Duke University College of Law, Maijorie Bristol of the Tennessee
Post-Conviction Defender Office, andJeb Beecham, student at the University Tennessee College ofLw,
for their assistance and encouragement.
** Gina Holland,Juslice Urges wFus
on Intl Law, THE TENNFSSEEAN, May 17, 2002 (quoting from
a speech delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to the 2002 American Law Institute Meeting (May
15, 2002)).
1. This Article specifically deals with international human rights law originating in provisions of

treaties that the United States has ratified.
2. The impetus for this article was an international conference on human rights and the death
penalty at which many of the attendees were from countries other than the United States.
3. Since the purpose of this Article is to assist the practicing attorney unfamiliar with international
law, it does not seek to evaluate the various scholarly interpretations ofinternational treaty provisions and

their applications.
4. Many of the same legal hurdles hamper the application ofcustomary international law in state
courts, but for purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the international law that is at issue derives
from treaties entered into by the United States.
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in American state courts. Three such legal hurdles are created by the
United States Senate's attachment of reservations to treaties it ratifies.
The treaty reservations that will be discussed are "existing law and
substantive" reservations, "federalism" reservations, and "non-selfexecuting" reservations.
Sections III and IV of the Article discuss, respectively, political and
ethical hurdles to applying human rights law in state courts. Section V
sets forth ways to scale the barriers and enforce international human
rights law in the state courts. In each Section, the concepts are
illustrated contextually by the use of various court decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL AND STATE SYSTEMS
OF GOVERNMENT

A. Separate Sovereigns, SeparateBranches, SeparateDuties
To understand the legal barriers that hinder the application of
international human rights laws in the state courts of the United States,
one must begin with a basic understanding of the American dual system
of government. In the United States, federal and state governments
exist separately and independently of each other. Each has its own set
of laws and its own courts. In state law matters, state law governs and
the states are sovereign. 5 In federal matters, however, the federal
government and the laws it has passed are the exclusive authority.'
The federal and state governments are tripartite systems, with powers
divided between three separate, independent branches-the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial branches. Each branch plays some role
in whether international human rights laws will have force in the United
States collectively, or of any state, individually.
On the federal level, the legislative branch, consisting of two houses,
the House of Representatives and the Senate, has the power to enact
federal laws and authorize regulations that apply in the federal courts
and to the federal government, and often, indirectly, to state
governments as well. The executive branch has specific constitutional
authority, with the aid of the legislative branch, particularly the Senate,
to enter into treaties.' Thus, the Treaty Clause of the United States

5. U.S. CONSI. amend. X; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); seegeneral o LAURENCE
CONSTIIUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-20 - 5-23 (1988).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
7. For purposes of this Article, "treaty" refers to a contract between two or more nations. For a
genend discussion of the Senate's treaty power, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope
qo'U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation qf Treaties, 67 CHI-KrNT L. REV. 571 (1991).

H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
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Constitution, found in Article II, grants power to the President "with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur."8 In more common parlance,
treaties in the United States do not become law until they are ratified.'
The legislative branch as a whole is responsible for passing laws to
effectuate treaty provisions.
In addition to its specific treaty power under Article II, the executive
branch of government, through the office of the President, may also
enter into executive agreements" with foreign states that bind the
federal government. Executive agreements are international agreements
entered into by virtue of specific congressional authority;" authority
granted in a prior Article II treaty;12 or by independent constitutional
authority.l3 These executive agreements, in effect, have the same force
as a treaty.
The judicial branch is the branch of government that is the actual
focus of this Article. Though separate and independent, its power is
largely derived from and circumscribed by the other branches of
government. It is the duty of the judicial branch to interpret the laws of
the nation and of the states, respectively. Thus, for example, the
judiciary may be called upon to determine the appropriateness of the
exercise of the treaty power or the application or interpretation of
specific treaty provisions.
While the functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
ofstate governments are similar to those of the federal government, state
governments have no treaty power. States are prohibited, by
8. U.S. CONS'Ir. art.
II, § 2, cl.
2.
9. RFSTATIE,.MENT' (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RI,'IATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITIED STATI'SXn
§103
cmt.c. (1987).
10. Thescthree typesofcxecutive agreements ale describedby THEUNrI1-)STATl.sDEPART.\N1"

OF STAIES, CIRCULAR as "agreemcnts pursuant to treaty," "agreements pursuant to legislation," and
"agreements pursuant to the constitutional authority of the president."
11. The Suite Department Circular provides that "[t he President may conclude an international
agreemcnt on the basis of-existing legislation or subject to legislation to be enacted by Congress .. " Id.
12. The State Department Circular provides that "[tlhe President may conclude an international
agreement pursuant to a treaty brought into force with the advice and consent of the Senate, whose
provisions constitute authorization for the agreement by the Executive without subsequent action by the
Congress .... Id.
13. The Sute Department Circular provides that
[tihe President may conclude an international agreement on any subject within his
constitutional authority so long as the agreement isnot inconsistent with legislation enacted
by the Cong-ess in the exercise of its constitutional authority. The constitutional authority
fo- the President to conclude international agreements include: (a)The President's authority
as Chief Executive to irepresent the nation in foicign aflais; (b) The Pr-esident's authority
to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; (c) The President's authority as
"Commander-in-Chiel"; and, (d) The President's authority to "take care that the laws be
thithfully executed. Id.
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constitutional provision, 4 from entering into treaties, alliances, or
confederations, and are likewise prohibited, without the consent of
Congress, from entering "into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power."' 5 The exclusive power to enter into
treaties is delegated by the United States Constitution to the federal
government.
B. Legal PrinciplesRelative to the Application of InternationalHuman Rights
Law in State Courts
Other legal principles entrenched in the American justice system
influence the application of international human rights law in state
courts. Foremost of these legal principles is federalism."b Federalism
refers to the United States system of government, in which a central
federal government is granted ("delegated") certain specific rights with
all other rights reserved to the states or the people. The United States
Constitution, in the Tenth Amendment, sets forth the concept: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." 7 As it relates to the topic of this Article, the treaty
power is a power specifically "delegated" to the United States by the
Constitution; likewise, specifically "prohibited" by the Constitution to
the States.' 8
The Constitution declares that "[tlreaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."' 9 Treaties are subject to the limitations of the Constitution and may not confer any power that the Constitution forbids."

14. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 10, cl.1.

15. Id. cl.
3.
16. Seegenertl/yJOHN E. NOWAK & RONAID D. ROTUNI)A, CONS.UITIONAI. LAW

§ 4.10(6th ed.

2000).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X. For an intcrestingdiscussion o the founder.s' thoughts on the need lbi
the Tenth Amendment, seeTHE COMI'IH'I. BiItOF RIGHIS: THI.;
DRAIIS, DEATIS, SOURCE.S AN)
ORIGINS 681-704 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) Ihcreinalter THE COIPI.I. B11, O.'RIGHTS].
18. Seegenerally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, snpra
note 16, at § 6.6.

19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
20. In the 1920 decision of Afissouri v. Holland, Justice Holmes suggested that treaties in
contravention ol'the Constitution were nonetheless enforceable. 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920). This views'was
iliccted definitively byJustice Black in Reid v. Coiv, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957): "INIo agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is fricc
from the
restraints of the Constitution." Though some so fearcd the misreading of the Holland decision that they
sought a constitutional amendment limiting federal treaty power, Congress has
ililed to adopt such a
proposal. SeeLOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 146-47 (1972).
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Unless a treaty is contrary to the Constitution, however, it shares with
the Constitution the position of being supreme law.21
Thus, in Missouriv. Holland,22 for example, the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret a treaty's enforcement within the
state of Missouri. The State argued that the Tenth Amendment limited
the federal government's power to enforce treaties in matters for which
the powers are reserved to the states. The Court rejected the argument
that the Tenth Amendment restricted the treaty power in Holland. The
Court explained that
it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the
powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article II,
Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by
Article VI treaties made under the authority of the United States,
along with the Constitution and laws of the United States .. .are
declared the supreme law of the land."
While the treaty power is exclusively delegated to the federal
government, the judicial power is not. Article III of the Constitution
vests the "judicial Power of the United States... in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and
establish. ' 24 That power, however, extends only to
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties... under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;
-to all Cases of admiralty and maritimeJurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to Controversies
between two or more States; ...between Citizens of Different States;
-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the
Grants of different States .. .
Thus, cases arising under state laws or state constitutions fall under the
powers reserved to the states. In those cases, the states and their justice
systems are sovereign. If, however, the state courts rule on matters of
state and federal law, the federal judiciary has the final word on the

21.

U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl.2;Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).

22. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In a prior decision, Huenstein v.Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1879), the
Court had declared that treaties
"are as much a part of the law of every State as its
awn local laws and
Constitution."
23. Id. at 432.
24. U.S. CONST.n. III,
§ 1.
25. Id. § 2. The Eleventh Amendment added two additional components to federaljurisdiction,
suits between states and citizens of other states and suits between states or citizens and breign states oi.
'
citizens. U.S. CONSI . amend. XI.
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federal questions." The judicial power of the United States is therefore
distributed between fifty state judiciaries, the District of Columbia, and
one federal judiciary, whose authority is limited to review of federal law.
The fifty state judiciaries, the structure of which varies greatly, 27 must
ascertain, apply, and interpret state law. In state law matters, the
judgment of the state court is said to be final. Butjust as it is becoming
increasingly difficult to draw lines separating national and international
laws it is equally difficult to clearly delineate between state and federal
law.2
In the areas of law most likely to be impacted by international human
rights law, federal, as well as state law, will likely be at issue in the state
courts. State and federal courts are required to uphold the United States
Constitution. By its own terms, the Constitution establishes itself as the
supreme law of the land.2 ' This means that the principles embodied in
the United States Constitution apply to the state and federal
governments. Pursuant to the passage of that Supreme law, the United
States adopted a Bill of Rights in the form of amendments to the
Constitution."0
Through a complex, not always consistent,

26. In Murdck v. City
iq'/emphis, 87 U.S. 590(1874), the Supreme Court had to determine whether
it had the power under theJudiciary Act of 1867 to decide all issues essential to a sute court judgment or
whether itsjurisdiction was limited to the fedcral law matters. The Court decided that the "Isjtatc courts
are the appropriate tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether
statutory or othcwiis." Id. at 626.
27. Most state judicial systcms ar e modclcd after the three-level feden-aljudiciary. At the first level,
or trial level, in courts of record, the parties are generally entitled to a trial byjury. The second level, or
appellate level, involves the review of legal issues, known as an appeal as of right. The third level, also
involving a review of legal issues, is generally a discretionary appeal. Some states, fbrexample, West
Virginia, have only a two-tierjudicial system.
28. Examples abound ofareas in which both the state and the fcdenal government have legislated.
In employment law, for example, the fedenl government has prohibited discriminatory employment
practices underTitle VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Most states have adopted similar laws.
29. The Supremacy Clause provides that
Itjhis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme L
of the LInd; and thejudges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contraiy
notwithsunding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
30. Litenally dozens of interesting books and articles tncc the adoption of the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. See,e.g., AKHII.REI';i)AMAR, THEBILI.OFRIGHTS: CREA'IONAND
RECONSTRUC'ION (1998); 1787: DRAI:i*INGTHEUNITo.S'I'AT'l1s
CONSITIUTION (Wilbouin E. Benton,
ed. 1986); RICHARD B. BERNSTEI.N & KYNi S. RICE, ARE WE 'TOBE A NATION: THE MAKING OF IHE
CONSTITrUTION (1987); THE COMPLE'T. mIx. OF RIGHTS, supra note 17; BURrONJESSEE HENDRICK,
Bui.WVARK OF THi.Ri.'PUICi.IC:
A BIOGRAPHY' OFTHE" CONS1ri'r'UIiON (1937); BROADUS MITCHEIL &
LOUISE PEARSON MIICHII.I., A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
ORIGIN, FORMATION, ADOI'IION, INTIEPREI'ATION (1975); CARl. BRENT SWISHEIR, AMERICAN
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jurisprudence, 3' some of those rights have been applied to the states,
making their provisions generally applicable in state courts.3 2 Thus,
while the Tenth Amendment reserves undelegated power to the states
and the people, states and theirjudges are bound" to follow the federal
Constitution and treaties adopted pursuant to that Constitution, because
they are supreme.
An offshoot of the Tenth Amendment and another essential piece to
the puzzle of applying international human rights laws in state courts is
the doctrine known as independent state constitutional grounds.34 Each
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPIENT (Edward McChesney Sait ed., 1954); JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND rITSAMENDMENTS (1993).
31. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at § 6.6. Initially, the Supreme Court
determined that the provisions ofthe Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Baomn v.. 9or, 32 U.S. 243
(1833). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed asserting that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process oflaw; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Following its passage, it was argued that the Privileges and Immunities and
Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment served to "incorporate" the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. The Court, in a series ofdecisions, rejected the idea of"total incorporation" choosing instead to
hold that certain of the rights, and other penumbras of those rights, were selectively incorporated so as to
apply to the states. The Supreme Court's most recent standard for determining whether rights set forth in
the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states as a result ofFourteenth Amendment incorporation is set forth
in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 143 (1968).
32. For articles detailing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding whether the rights contained in
the Bill of Rights applied to the states, see, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Inonporatethe
Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); William Crosskey, Charles Fairman, Legislative Histogy' and the
ConstitutionalLimits on StateAuthofiy, 22 U. CHI. L. RE\,. 1 (1954).
33. The simple assertion that state courtjudges are bound to follow treaties passed by the Congress
would seem defensible in light of previous Supreme Court decisions including Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S.
678 (1887). The issue firamed by the Court in Baldwin was
not whether Congress has the constitutional authority [to provide lbr punishment of the
accused] but whether it has so done. That the trcaty-making power has been surrendered
by the states, and given to the United States, is unquestionable. It is true, also, that the
treaties made by the United States, and in force, are part of the supreme law of the land,
and that they are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States.
Id. at 682-83. Three decades later the Court reiterated the supremacy of the treaty power, this time in the
context ofwhether states could enjoin the enforcement of treaty provisions within their state boundaries.
In Mhissouriv. Holand, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920), the Court said:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States. It is open to question whether the authority ofthe United States means more
than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that
there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power, but they must be ascertained in a
different way .... The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be
fbund in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.
34. A virtual library of information exists on the issue ofindependent state ccnstitutional gr-ounds,
including many extensive bibliographies. See, e.g.,JENNIFEi.R FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW:
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state in the United States has its own state constitution, often similar,
and sometimes virtually identical to the federal constitution. But
because of the principles explicit in federalism and the reserved powers
of the Tenth Amendment, the states are at liberty to provide different
or additional constitutional rights to their citizens so long as they
preserve, at a minimum, the rights secured by the United States
Constitution. If a state court has made a decision on state grounds,
independent from federal grounds and adequate to support the state
court decision, a federal court cannot interfere with or review the state
court ruling unless the state has failed to protect rights granted by the
federal constitution.3

6

A good backdrop for illustrating the principles of federalism, the
reservation of states' rights, and independent state constitutional grounds
is provided by recent and not-so-recent developments in capital
punishment law in the United States. 7 In 1989, the United States
Supreme Court found "insufficient evidence of a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses
for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment."3 " In the legal principles nomenclature described in this
Article, the Court held that the federal Constitution did not prohibit the
execution of the mentally retarded." Thus, states were free to pass laws
allowing the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders.
While the federal Constitution did not prohibit this punishment, it did
not, and could not, require it. The Supreme Court noted, for example,
that at least one state, Georgia, 40 and the federal government, by

LriGATIINcINI)I\II)UAI .RIGH'I , CI.A IS ANI) DI.'II.NNsi.s (1992); TI. WA'II'S, STI'rCONsTITLrIIONAI.
LA\V Di, IEIo'Mi, I: ABIBIIOGRAI'HY (1991); seegenerally atthorities cited in Randall T. Shepard, 77e
Renaissance in Stte Consliltutional .av.w:7Tere area Few Dange, But JH'luts the Alt enalive?,61 AiB. L. RE\'. 1529,

1532 nn. 14, 15 (1998).
Most scholars in this arca attribute the beginning of'the deluge to a speech given byJustice William
Btrennan, printed in the Hanrard Law Review. WillianiJ. Bennan,Jr., State Constilulionm and the lrotection qf
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. RI'V. 489 (1977). Even this attribution has generated sonic controversy. See

Shepherd, supra at 1530 n.6 (arguing the "work ofmuhiple state supreme courts who continued to engage
in state constitutional adjudication in spite of the nearly overpowering judicial activism of the Warren
court" spawned state constitutional jurisprudencc). Whatever the cause, the cllect has been a dramatic
increase in the number of state supreme court decisions that arc bascd solely on the state constitution.

35. See
generally NOWAK & ROl'UNDA, supra note 16, at § 1.6(c).
36. Id.
37.

Seenotes 39-47 in/hi and accompanying text..

38. Peruy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
39. Id. at 340.
40. Georgia prohibited the execution ofthe mentally re arded in 1989. GA. CODE AaNN. § 17-7-

13 1j) (Supp. 1988). Maryland had passed a statute to pmhibit such executions beginningonjuly I ofthat
year. MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27, § 412(l)(1)(1989). Peny was decided onJune 26, 1989.
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statute,4 did not allow the execution of the mentally retarded. Because
of federalism and the Tenth Amendment, Georgia could certainly enact
a state law, by virtue of its state constitution, that bestowed additional
rights on certain citizens, i.e., the "right" of a mentally retarded
individual to avoid execution for a capital offense.
Between 1989 and June 2002, sixteen states4 2 enacted laws like
Georgia's that prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded. In two
states, Virginia and Nevada, one of the two legislative branches had
passed legislation to disallow execution of the mentally retarded.43
OnJune 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court revisited its 1989
decision and held, in Atkins v. Virginia, that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution "'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to
take the life' of a mentally retarded offender."44
As a result of the Atkins decision, states can no longer execute mentally
retarded offenders, even if state laws allow it. This is because the
Supreme Law of the Land, the United States Constitution, as presently
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, does not allow
the execution of the mentally retarded. The rights reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment do not include the right to pass laws that
run afoul of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
Another example will clarify the contrast between state and federal
law. During the same year that the Supreme Court of the United States
originally upheld a state's right, under the federal Constitution, to

41. 21 U.S.C. § 848(l) (1988) (The Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).
42. Those states wer e Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington,
Indiana, Kansas, New York,Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North
Carolina. The Texas legislature unanimously adopted legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally
ill, but the governor of Texas vetoed the bill. Atkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 346 nn. 12-15 (2002).
43. Both Nevada and Virginia had pending legislation at the time of the Atkins' decision. See id. at
346 n.17.
44. Id. at 350 (quoting Ford %.Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion in which five justices agreed. In his analysis, Justice Stevens began with the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment noting that it requires as a "'precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."' Id. at 343-44
(quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). Next, Justice Stevens wrote that
proportionality and excessiveness arc to be judged by current standards, not historic ones. The Eighth
Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' Id. at 344 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Proportionality under
evolving standards of decency must be based on "'objective factors,"' the most reliable of which 'is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.' Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75
(1980) & Penry v.Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). Finally, while thejudgmcnt of state legislatures is
significant, Justice Stevens concluded that "'the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment."' Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).

946

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 71

execute the mentally retarded, it upheld a state's right to execute those
who committed capital offenses as juveniles, at least those who had
attained the age of sixteen at the time of their offenses. In Stanford v.
Kentucky,4 the Court held that executing offenders who were either
sixteen or seventeen years of age when they committed a capital offense
"does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment."4 A year earlier, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, a
plurality of the Court had concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments [to the United States Constitution] prohibit the execution
of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her
offense"4 7

At the time of the Stanford decision, fourteen states and the District of
Columbia disallowed capital punishment.4"
Twelve states49 that
authorized capital punishment disallowed the execution of those who

were under eighteen years of age at the time of their offenses. Since
1989, two states, Montana and Indiana, have passed laws prohibiting
the execution of those who commit their capital crimes while under the
age of eighteen years.
Since the Stanford and Thompson cases, the Supreme Court has been
asked on numerous occasions to reconsider the issue of whether the
United States Constitution allows the execution of those who were

juveniles at the time they committed capital offenses.5' Each time the
Court has declined the invitation. In a footnote in the Atkins decision,

45. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
46. Id. at 380.
47. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838(1988). Justice O'Connor, who furnished the fifih
vote that spared the life of Thompson, did not agree that the evidence before the Court established a
national consensus against the execution of those whose crimes were committed belbre age sixteen; she,
instead, concurred because she would have set aside the sentencc on "narrower grounds." Ri.at 849
(O'Connoi,J., concurring).
48. Sfrqli/rd, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
49. Id. The states that did not allow the execution of those who committed their offenses while
under the age of eighteen are listed in note 2 of the opinion. Id.at 370-71 n.2.
50. MONT.COIEANN. § 45-5-102 (1999); IND. CoIw' § 35-50-2-3 (1998).
51. See, e.g., Hain v.Mullin, 123 S.Ct. 993 (2003); In re Stanlbrd, 123 S.Ct. 472 (2002); Patterson
v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002); Beazley v. Texas, 535 U.S. 1091 (2002); Richardson v. Luebbers, 536 U.S.
957 (2002); Simmons v.Luebbcrs, 534 U.S. 924 (2001); Hain v. Oklahoma, 511 U.S. 1020 (1994).
52. Most recently the Court denied habeas rcliefin the case ofKevin Stanlbrd, the appellant in the
originaljusenile death pcnalty case. Four justices,Justices Stevens, Breycr, Ginsburg, and Souterdissented.
The fbur justices urged considcration of the case in light of Akiru and noted that "with one exception [the
reasons for the Atkin" decisioni apply with equal or greater force to the execution of juvenile olinders."
In re Skirm.]rd, 123 S. Ct. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted at length from Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in the original Slbanfrddccision, 492 U.S. at 394-96, and suggested that what
had transpircd since that decision made it even more inappropriate to allow the execution of those who
committed capital oflnscs while juveniles. In addition to laws giving juvenilcs fi:wer legal obligations,
Justice Stevens ref-rred to
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the Court noted that since the date of the Stanford decision only two
states had raised the threshold age for execution. 3
The United States Constitution allows,54 but does not, and could not
require, due to the Tenth Amendment, the execution of those who are
sixteen or seventeen at the time they commit a capital offense. The
now-twenty-eight states that do not allow these executions have decided,
pursuant to state authority, 5 to provide these additional "rights" to
juvenile offenders. Arguably, though not with certainty (because of the
Thompson plurality), no state may authorize capital punishment for those
who commit their offenses when they are less than sixteen years of age.
One final circumstance, presented by a hypothetical, will complete
the explanation of the federal/state law distinction. Assume that a state
court, interpreting the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, concludes that the death penalty is unconstitutional
because of the risk of executing the innocent.- 6 Under current Supreme

[n]euroscientific evidence of the last few years [that] has revealed that adolescent brains are
not fully developed [leading] to erratic behaviors and thought processes ....Moreover, in
the last 13 years, a national consensus has developed that juvenile offenders should not be
executed. . . . The practice of executing such offenders is a relic of the past and is
inconsistent with evolving standards ofdecency in a civilized society. We should put an end
to this shameful practice.
In reStanford, 123 S.Ct. at 474-75.
In reaction to the Court's decision to not revisit the issue, the .A\w rfrk Times praised the dissentingjustices.
In an editorial published on-October 24, 2002, the Times noted:
As the dissenters correctly observed, the rationale that led the court to declare the execution
of retarded persons to be unconstitutional argues for revisiting thejuvenile death penalty.
In both instances there arc profound questions of the defendant's capacity to Fully
understand the consequences of their actions, and thus their level of culpability.
Editorial, The Disgrace ofJuenile Executions,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002 at 34. Similarly, the IWVashington Post
noted that the 'juvenile death penalty . . . is one of the least defensible aspects of American capital
punishment .... Distinguishing between legal childhood and adulthood seems a far more rational place
to [draw the line] than between the sophomore and junior years of high school." End the Juvenile Death
Penal9,, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2002 at A26.
53. 536 U.S. at 347. This comment was for the purpose ofdemonstrating the consistent state trend
away from allowing the execution of the mentally retarded and to contrast that trend with state legislature's
actions with regard to execution ofjuveniles. Apparently, however, according to thejustices who dissented
from the denial of certiorari in Stanobrd, the comment in the footnote was incorrect. The dissenters noted
that in addition to Montana and Indiana whose legislatures had acted to prohibit the execution of those
who were juveniles at the time of their offenses after Starford, the federal government, New York, and
Kansas, whose death penalty laws were enacted after the first Stnfird decision likewise did not allow the
execution ofjuveniles. Similarly, Washington, by a decision of its supreme court, had banned the practice
as well. In re StanJird, 123 S.Ct. at 473.
54. Stanfbrd v.Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
55. In most states, the state "authority" is a statute passed by the state legislature. One notable
exception is the state of Washington whose supreme court decided that executing those who wercjuvenilcs
at the time of their capital offenses was not authorized under state statutes. State v. Furman, 858 P.2d
1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993); see inkfa
for discussion of this case.
56. During the preparation ofthis Article, a non hypothetical federaljudge madejust such a ruling,
which was later reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. JudgeJed S. Rakoff, a federal district
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Court interpretation, that ruling should be reversed by a federal court,
whose obligation it is under Article VI, to apply the Constitution and to
bind state court judges to its terms. If the same state judge decided that
issue solely on state constitutional grounds, the federal courts would be
unable to set aside the decision. Only a higher state court, with the
similar obligation to apply state constitutional precedent, would be able
to reverse or affirm the state court decision interpreting state law.
The hypothetical demonstrates a point that is essential to the
arguments set forth in the last section of this Article as a means of scaling
the hurdles to the application of international human rights law in state
courts. When a state court's decision is based on the application or
interpretation of state law or of a provision of the state constitution, the
state courts are the final arbiters. The federal courts cannot interfere
with the state court's judgment, unless the state court judgment violates
federal law to the citizen's detriment.
These underlying structural, procedural, and institutional principles,
referred to succinctly as the separation of powers, the independence of
government branches, federalism, supremacy, and independent state
grounds, are essential to the following discussion of the legal, political,
and ethical hurdles to applying international human rights law in state
courts.
II. LEGAL HURDLES TO THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN STATE COURTS

The juxtaposition of two of the underlying legal principlesfederalism and the Tenth Amendment reservation of state's rightsforms the most frequently discussed, and perhaps the most formidable,
hurdle to applying international law in state courts. A third principlesupremacy-coupled with federalism and the expanded Tenth

,judge for the Southern District of New York, ruled that the current firdenl death penalty violated due
process because the
unacceptably high rate at which innocent people are convicted of capital crimes, when
coupled with the firequently prolonged delays before such erroms are detected (and then often
only fortuitously or by application of ncwIy-dcvelopcd techniques), compels the conclusion
that execution under the Federal Death Penalty Act, by cutting off the opportunity for
exoneration, denies due process and, indeed is tantamount to foreseeable, state-sponsored
murder of innocent human beings.
United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp.2d 256, 268 (S.D.NY 2002), revd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
Judge Rakolf had announced his view preliminarily in United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp.2d 416 (S.D.
N.Y. 2002), but had given the government time to respond. Id.; seealso Benjamin Weiser, lmanhatanJudge
Finds FederalDeath Low Unconstitutional,N.Y. TINIF.S,July 2, 2002, at B 1.
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Amendment concept of independent state constitutional grounds,
provides a viable solution.
A. Reservations to Treaties
As any student of the United States' ratifications of human rights
treaties knows, the United States has routinely adopted important
human rights treaties subject to so-called reservations, understandings,
and declarations. 57 These reservations 5' are several, 5 but for the
purpose of this Article, 60 three reservations will be briefly addressed."
1. Existing Law Reservation
One of the reservations frequently employed by the United States
Senate, in ratifying treaty provisions that impact human rights, is a
reservation that United States' "adherence to an international human
rights treaty should not effect-or promise-change in existing law or

57. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Contentions: The Ghost qfSenator Bricker, 89 AM.J.
INT'L L. 341 (1995).
58. Under international law, nations cannot attach reservations that are "incompatible with the
object and purpose of the agreement." RE.STATEME N'T (THIRD)OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313. This
section of the Restatement summarizes Article 19 ofthe VIENNA CONVENION ON THE LAW OFTRA'TIEIS,
8 I.L.M. 679. The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but recognizes most of its
provisions as customary international law that is binding on the United States.
59. Professor Henkin has described the reservations as being guided by several "principles:"
1. The United States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able to
carry out because it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution; 2. United States
adherence to an international human rights treaty should not effect-or promise-change
in existing U.S. law or practice. 3. The United States will not submit to thejurisdiction of
the International Court ofJustice to decide disputes as to the interpretation or application
of human rights conventions. 4. Every human rights treaty to which the United States
adheres should be subject to a "federalism clause", so that the United States could leave
implementation of the convention largely to the states. 5. Every international human rights
agreement should be "non-sell-executing."
Henkin, supra note 57, at 341.
60. Many other articles deal exhaustively with the issue of treaty reservations, their eflect, and their
interpretations. See, e.g., Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem ofResenwations to Hunan
Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEYJ. IN'L L. 277 (1999); Douglass Cassel, InternationalHuman Rights Law in
Practice: Does InternationalHuman Rights Lw A'Iake A Diffirence, 2 CHI.J. INlt. L. 121 (2001); Martin S.
Flaherty, Are We To Be Aiiion? FederalPbwer vs. "States Rights"in ForeignAJfihrs, 70 U. COIw. L. Ri'v. 1277
(1999); Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Resenpations, and State Consent, 96 AJIL. 531 July
2002); Andres E. Montalvo, Resenations to the American Convention on Human Rights: A.,ewAppnsach, 16 Am.
U. INT'l. L. REV\. 269 (2001).
61. Numerous authors have written on the "non-self executing" reservation as well as the
jurisdiction reservation. See,e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 CO.U10. L. RE\'. 2154
(1999); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, .Ain-Self-Evecutim, ane the Orignal Understanding,
99 CoLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999).
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practice.""2 Thus, if the provisions of the treaty are inconsistent with the
current United States law, the Senate is asserting by attaching an
existing law reservation that the ratification neither changes, nor
promises to change, the existing law. This kind of reservation, albeit a
more explicit one, attached to the Senate's ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992,"' is the
basis for the conclusion reached by state courts that, despite the treaty
ratification, states may continue to execute those who committed capital
offenses while at least sixteen years of age." 4
As noted above, states have different rules respecting the execution of
those who committed capital offenses while they were juveniles'3 A
plurality of the United States Supreme Court has disallowed the
execution of those who were under sixteen at the time of the commission
of the capital offense, but a majority has paved the way for states to
execute those who commit capital crimes while sixteen years of age or
older."6 Thus, in the terms used by the Senate reservation in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, existing law in the
United States allows the execution of those who commit capital offenses
while at least sixteen years of age. The Senate's reservation asserts that
the ratification of the Covenant does not change, nor promise to change,
that law.
But can the Senate ratify a treaty, thereby making the treaty the
"Supreme law of the land" under the United States Constitution and
then nullify essential provisions by attaching an existing law reservation?
Those who support the Senate's power to attach reservations argue that
since the Senate has the exclusive power to ratify treaties, it must have
the power to ratify them in an altered form." The converse argument

62. Henkin, supra note 57, at 341.
63. Amongotler things, the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights provides in Article
7 that "Into one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."
The ratification by the United States Senate included a reservation that this phrase Mefered to "the cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." The validity of this reservation, and similar ones attached to the
ratifications of the convention on Racial Discrimination and the Torture Convention, has been debated
widely. See,
e.g.,William A. Schabas, Invalid Resen'ations to the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights:
Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOKIYNJ. INT'L L. 277 (1995); Liwyers Committee for Human
Rights, Statenents an US. Ratification of'the CCPR, 14 HUM. Rms. L.J. 125 (1993); Connie de la Vega &
Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treay Re5enlation Provide Sanctuay.fir theJuvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S. F.
L. REX. 735 (1998).
64. Seee.g., McGilbcriy v. Suite, 2003 WL 751279 (Miss. 2003); Servin v. Suite, 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev.
2001); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998).
65. Seenulffa text accompanying notes 45-55.
66. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v, Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
67. Stcliin A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope qfUS. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and
Operation qo'Treaties, 67 CHI.-Ki.'NT L. Ri-E\. 571,584-85 (1992).
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is that, under the accepted principles of customary international law,
reservations that are incompatible with the purpose and object of the
agreement may not be attached.6" Has the Senate, by reserving the
right to execute juveniles despite clear treaty provisions to the contrary,
violated customary international law? Does the attachment of the
incompatible reservation have the effect of nullifying the treaty
ratification? Or is the incompatible reservation of no effect?
These and other complex questions were before the United States
Supreme Court in late 1999. The State of Nevada was preparing to
execute an offender sentenced to death for an offense committed while
sixteen years of age. 9 On a post conviction motion for correction of an
illegal sentence, allowed under state law, the defendant challenged the
state's right to execute him in light of the United States' ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7" and
customary international law, which he argued prohibited the execution
of those whose crimes were committed while they were juveniles. The
United States Senate, however, ratified the treaty with the following
reservation:
That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than
a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age. 7"

68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 313(I)(c). Under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for example, a state may not submit a reservation to the
treaty obligation if the reservation "is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at art. 19(c)(I 969); see also infra note 71.
69. Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 968 (1996).
70. Article 6, paragraph 5 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and
shall not be carried out on pregnant women." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 6, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
71. Id. The United Nations Human Rights Committee addressed the issue of the United States'
reservation in April 1994 and issued this comment:
The Covenant neither prohibits reservations nor mentions any type of permitted
reservation. [Wlhere a reservation isnot prohibited by the treaty or falls within the specified
permitted categories, a State may make a reservation provided it is not incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty .... Reservations that offend peremptory norms would
not be compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.... Accordingly, a State
may not reserve the right.., to execute ... children .... The normal consequence of an
unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving
party. Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant
will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.
General Comricnt 24. General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article
41 of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 52d Scss.,
5, 6, 8, 18, U.N. Doc.
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When the Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
applying the provisions of the treaty to "supersede ' 72 state law, which
specifically allowed the execution of individuals who committed capital
offenses after they had reached sixteen years of age,73 it declined to do
so. "We conclude that the Senate's express reservation of the United
States' right to impose a penalty of death on juvenile74 offenders negates
Domingues' claim that he was illegally sentenced.
Two of Nevada's high court justices were not so easily persuaded.
For both, the issue of the conflict between a state statute and a treaty
ratified by the United States government required greater inquiry. 75 For
one of the dissentingjustices, the treaty provision was the "supreme law
of the land" and was, as a result, binding on the State of Nevada.76
It appeared that the Supreme Court of the land would resolve the
issue. In June 1999, the Court invited the Solicitor General's office to
'77
file a brief in the case "expressing the views of the United States.
After receipt of the brief, which argued that the petition should be
denied,78 the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,79 leaving
state courts to grapple with the issue without high court guidance."0

CCPR/C/21/Rc\/l/Add.6 (1994). Aycar later, the Human Rights Commission commented that the
United States's reservation was "incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant." Annual
Geneal Assembly Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm./,
50thScss., Supp. No. 40,
279, 292, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).
72. The Nevada Supreme Court fiamed the issue as "whether NRS 176.025 is superseded by an
international treaty natified by the United States, which prohibits the execution of individuals who
committed capital offenses while under the age ofeighteen." Domingues v.Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1279
(Nev'. 1998).
73. Nirv. Ri.'v. STAT. § 176.025 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on those individuals
who were under sixteen years of age at the time that the offense was committed.
74. 961 P.2d at 1280.
75. Id. at 1281, 1282 (Springer,J., dissenting) (Rose,J., dissenting). ForJustice Rose, "these I[werel
not easy questions... " but "complicated" ones that "deserved a full hearing, evidentiary if necessaly, on
the clect ofour nation's ratification of the ICCPR and the reservation by the United States Senate to that
treaty's provision prohibiting the execution ofanyone who committed a capital crime while undereightcen
yea s of age." Id. at 1281.
76. Id. at 1280-81 (Springer,J., dissenting).
77. Domingues v.Necvada, 526 U.S. 1156 (1999).
78. Brief ir the United States as Amicus at 26, Domingucs v.Nevada, 526 U.S. 1156 (1999) (No.
98-8327).
79. Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999).
80. In his dissent,Justice Rose noted thata fedenal court "that deals with fedenal law on a daily basis
might be better equipped to address the[ I issues." Id. at 1281 (Rose,J., dissenting). Since the denial of
certiorari in Daningues, Nevada has ruled consistently with its Dmingues decision in Senmin v. State, 32 P.3d
1277 (Nev. 2001). In Senin, the Nevada Supreme Court cited its prior decision, the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari, and a recent Fifth Circuit decision which "agreed with [the] conclusion that the Senate's
reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR was valid." Id. at 1286 n.29 (citing Beazley v.Johnson, 242 F.3d
248, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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An order of the United States Supreme Court denying certiorari is
not an expression of an opinion on the merits of a case.8' Standard
protocol attaches no interpretive guidance to the denial of certiorari.
That being recognized, however, the practical result of the High Court's
failure to accept and decide the issue is that most state courts faced with
the issue will give effect to the reservation, not the treaty." That
practice will pose another significant legal dilemma. If the Constitution
defines a ratified treaty as the supreme law of the land, can the Senate
both adopt a treaty and subject it to a reservation that has the effect of
negating its provisions? Under the tripartite separation of powers, does
not the Senate's action have the effect of usurping certain powers
granted to the judicial branch, that is the application and interpretation
of the law of the land?83

81. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). AsJustice Houston of the Alabama
Supreme Court noted on a case raising the international human rights treaty claims, the Supreme Court
sometimes "points out those concerns which, although unrelated to the meritsjustify the decision not to
grant review." Ev pare Burgess, 811 So. 2d 617, 631 (Ala. 2000) (Houston, J., concurring) (quoting
Carpenter v. Gomez, 516 U.S. 981 (1995)). In the words ofJustice Stevens, from whose memorandum on
denial ofcertiorariJustice Houston was quoting:
[A]n order denying a petition for certiorari expresses no opinion on the merits of the case.
That is so, in part, because the Court properly exercises broad discretion in the
administration of its docket, and in part because there are oftenjurisdictional or prudential
reasons for refusing to grant review of the questions presented in a petition. Nonetheless,
when the Court denies a petition that raises a substantial question, it is sometimes useful to
point out those concerns which, although unrelated to the meritsjustify the decision not
to grant review.
Carpenter, 516 U.S. at 981.
82. Since the Court's denial of certiorari in Dningues,a number of state and federal courts have
relied on either the denial or the Nevada Supreme Court majority decision in Domingues to rule similarly
on challenges raised to death sentences imposed on juveniles. In Bease v.Director, No. 1: 98cv1601, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22606 (E.D.Tex. Sept. 30, 1999), the court overruled a death-sentenced inmate claim
under international law stating:
Only one court has submitted an opinion on the specific issue that petitioner alleges. The
Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the claim ofa person who was convicted ofcapital murder
for a crime committed while the person was sixteen years old. The Nevada Court found
that the ICCPR did not supersede state law which allowed the sentence of death upon a
sixteen year old and the express reservation by the Senate negated the claim. Additionally,
the Fifth Circuit has reviewed the issue of the Senate reservations to the ICCPR and found
the reservations must be given effect when reviewing claims under the ICCPR. Thus,
petitioner's claim under the ICCPR is without merit given the Senate reservations and the
lack of a self executing treaty.
Id. at *21 (citations omitted).
Judges in Alabama, Florida, and Kansas have also cited Domingues. See, e.g., EvpareBurgess, 811 So. 2d at
630 (Houston,J., concurring); Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d I (Fla. 1999); State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139
(IKm. 2001).
83. An academic answer to the question can be provided by the so-called rules ofconstruction that
give effect to the latter of two inconsistent provisions. The application of that rule of construction in this
context seems questionable.
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2. Federalism Reservation
A second reservation commonly employed by the United States
Senate in its ratification of international human rights treaties is the
federalism reservation. The reservation, premised on the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of undelegated powers to the states, asserts
that the federal government does not have the express constitutional
authority to bind states to the provisions of international human rights
laws found in treaty provisions.8 4 The basis of the assertion is that the
scope of the treaty power, which is not defined in the Constitution, is
subject to the limitations of the Tenth Amendment, thereby depriving
Congress of the right to bind states to treaty provisions that impact
matters that are reserved for the states. For purposes of this Article,
then, the contention is specifically that international human rights
standards, provided by treaty, cannot impact the criminal justice laws
or standards of the individual states.
Those adverse to the states' rights approach, and suspect offederalism
reservations, argue that the Supremacy Clause of Article VI clearly
elevates treaties and their provisions above state law.15 Thus, a treaty
"made under the Authority of the United States" would trump state law
and bind all 'Judges in every State.""8t This approach seems to be
clearly supported by United States Supreme Court precedent.
In Missouri v. Holland Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in a brief
opinion, discussed for decades by a multitude of scholars, 7 upheld a
statute, passed to enforce a treaty, against a Tenth Amendment
challenge raised by the State of Missouri. To Justice Holmes, the
question could not be resolved by reference to the Tenth Amendment
alone; rather, the resolution of the case required consultation of Article
VI as well.

84. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITEID STATES CONSTITUTION 181 & 453

n.31 (2d cd. 1996); PeterJ. Spiro, The Sittes andInternationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. Ri.;V. 567, 568
(1997); David Stewart, United States Ratification yfthe International Covenant on Civil and PoditicalRight, 42
DEPAUI. L. RE\. 1183, 1201 (1993); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionalityo'Congressional-

Evecuth,eAgreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 826 (2001).
85. John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1300-02 (1993); Yoo, supra note 84, at 828.
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI.

87. 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see, e.g., Edward D. Re, The Universal Declarationof'Human Rights and the
Domestic Courts, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 665 (2002); Brad R. Roth, Understandingthe 'Understanding:
Federalism Comtraints on Human Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891 (2001); David M. Golove,
Treaty-MakIingand thej\ttion: The HistoricalFoundations0/'the .5tionalism Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH.
L.Riiv. 1075 (2000); Curtis Bradley, The Treay Power andAmericam Federalism,97 MICH. L. Rixw. 390 (1998);
Harold Hongiu Koh, I IntonationalLaw Really Sta te Law, Ill HARV.L.RE\'. 1824 (1998); Louis Henkin,
InternationalLaw as Law in the United States-, 82 MICH. L. Ri.'V. 1555 (1984).
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Despite the confluence of two significant constitutional provisions, the
Hollandmajority made the resolution of the matter seem almost glib:
Valid treaties of course "are as binding within the territorial limits of
the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the
United States." No doubt the great body of private relations usually
fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power
.... Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is
involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with
that of another power .... '
The Court had often stated the proposition that "state law must yield
when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a
treaty."8 9 In Pink, for example, the Court said that "the power of a State
to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs counter
to the public policy of the forum must give way before the superior
Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or
agreement."90
Though given ample opportunity to do so, the United States Supreme
Court has not revisited the alleged Tenth Amendment/Supremacy
Clause conflict. Thus, the Senate's consistent federalism reservation
attached to the major human rights treaties of this decade has, at best,
complicated the already complex issue of the application of
international human rights laws in state courts.
An example of the double-edged nature of the federalism sword is a
recent state court decision, again involving the state's right to execute
those who committed criminal offenses while a juvenile. In Ex Parte
Pressley9 the defendant argued before the Alabama Supreme Court that
his execution, permissible under state law, would violate international
law and international treaty provisions. The Alabama Supreme Court,
like the Nevada Supreme Court in Domingues, declined to find any
international barrier to the execution of the defendant who was sixteen
years of age at the time of the offense.92 The Alabama Supreme Court
noted the Senate's existing law reservation, as had the Nevada Supreme

88. Holland,252 U.S. at 434. In Baldwin, a Court had commented, also rather matter-of-factly, that
the tiaty-making power has been surrendered by the states, and given to the United States
.... [T]hc treaties made by the United States, and in fbrce, are part of the supreme law of
the land, and ... are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are
elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States.
120 U.S. at 682-83.
89. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942) (citing numerous other cases for the same
proposition).
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000).
92. Id. at 148-50.
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the
Court, but also focused on the declaration made by the Senate that
"provisions of Articles 1 through 27 ...are not self-executing."9 3
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the reservation was invalid
since it was incompatible with the treaty's purposes and objects, the

Alabama Supreme Court concluded:
We are not persuaded that Pressley has established that the Senate's
express reservation of this nation's right to impose a penalty of death
on juvenile offenders, in ratifying the ICCPR, is illegal .... [T]he
United States Supreme Court [has] rejected the argument that
international law should influence rulings under the federal
Constitution pertaining to the death penalty.94
A lone concurrence in the Alabama Supreme Court placed a different
perspective on the issue and brought the federalism issue into sharp

focus:
The majority opinion indicates that . . .the United States Senate

Reservation 1(2) relieves state justices from their constitutional
obligation to be bound by this treaty.... Federalism is alive and well.
The United States Constitution binds me as a Supreme CourtJustice of the State
ofAlabama to abide by the ICCPR,Article 6(5), and not to impose the sentence
ofdeath on Pressleyfor the crimes committed when he was 16years ofage. I am
not persuaded that the Senate's reservation, if not invalid for other
reasons, frees me as a state justice, as opposed to a federal justice or

judge, from the treaty's restriction against the imposition of a sentence
of death for a crime committed by a person below the age of 18
years.
Notwithstanding the concurring justice's concern, however, he nonetheless joined the majority in affirming the death sentence.
3. Non Self-Executing Reservation
A third reservation often attached to treaty ratifications by the United
States Senate is a reservation that the treaty rights are not "self-

93. Id. at 148. The Alabama Suprcme Court noted that the "Senate declared that the ICCPR was
not self-executing, suiting that the declaration was to 'clarify that the Covenant will not creatc a pivate
cause ofaction in U.S. Courts.' Id. at n.3 (quoting S. EXi.'C. Ri'v'., No. 102-23, at 15(1992)).
94. Id. at 148-49.
95. Id. at 150-51 (Houston,J, concurring) (emphasis added).
96. Though somewhat ambiguous, it appears that Justice Houston believed his decision to be
dictated by the Supreme Court's denial ofcertionui in Domingues, which he read as a denial on the merits
since the Court did not "point out concernsjustifying the decision not to grant review that were unrelated
to the merits." Id.; seealto sufn note 72. For a somewhat dilerent explanation of the reasons that dictated
Justice Houston's decision to concur, see notes and accompanying text ijfta notes 128-42.
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executing. 9 7 Although treaties that are ratified are declared by the
Constitution to be the "supreme law of the land," the attachment of a
non self-executing reservation suggests that the provisions do not
become effective until federal legislation implementing the provisions is
passed. 98 The internal inconsistency between federalism and non selfexecuting reservations should be immediately apparent.
The practical effect of having international human rights provisions
in treaties declared to be "non self-executing" is to mollify any effect in
the state (or federal) courts. If the treaties do not grant individual rights,
courts may disregard arguments based on the treaties or allow
procedural mechanisms to eliminate any real consideration of the rights.
The recent state and federal court decisions involving juveniles and
foreign nationals" offer 00
examples of the barriers constructed by non selfexecuting reservations.'

97. Numerous authors have addressed the myriad of issues raised by the non self-executing
rescrvation. See, e.g., David Sloss, Vhe Domestication ofInternationalHurmn Rights: Non-Self ExecutingDeclarations
andHuman Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. IN'l.L. 129 (1999); John Quigley, HumanRights Def/ises in U.S. Courts,
20 HUm.RTs.Q. 555 (1998); JordanJ. Paust, Avoiding 'Fraudulent'ExecutivePolic: Anayv.is qfthe Aim-Self
Execution qfthe Covenant on Civiland PliticalRight',42 DEPAULL. REV. 1257 (1993); Fank Newman, United
States
Human Rights Covenants and the United State Govenment: Diluted Promises, ForeseeableFutures, 42 DEPAUtL
L. REV. 1241 (1993); Damrosch, The Role qfthe United States Senate Concerning 'Sel-Evecuting' and "on-Sel'
Executing' Treaties, 67 CHI.-KiE;Ni" L. REX;. 515 (1991).
98. Fervent scholarly debate exists as to whether a treaty, once ratified, can be declaried non selfl
executing. One author, fbrexample,'contends that there "is a principled position in international law
which holds that an invalid reservation must be severed from the treaty leaving the underlying treaty
provisions its
well as the remainder of the treaty fully operational." RichardJ. Wilson, Defending a Criminal
Case with InternationalHuman Rights Lina, THE CHANIPION 28 (May 2000) (citing 15 HuM. RTS. L. Q. 464
(1994)). That debate, and its appropriate resolution, is beyond the scope of this Article.
99. Many authors have addressed the issues of Vienna Convention consular notification rights for
foreign nationals. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandlcr, Treaties, Self Execution, and thePublicLawLitigationAodel,42 VA.
J. IN'I"L L. 757 (2002); Jennifer Lynne Weinman, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal Procedure and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, 17 A.\I.U. INr'l. L. RE.;V. 857 (2002); Maigaret Mendenhall, A Case. br
Consular otifieattin: Treaty Obligations as a A'atter ql1i and Death, 8 Sw.J. L. & TRAD. Am.335 (2001-02);
Amandai E. Bu rks, ConsularAssistance For Foreign Dekndants:Avoiding De~liut and Frrtiffing a De/inse, 14 CAtP.
DEF.J. 29 (2001). Mexico recently sued the United States in the International Court ofJustice alleging
continual violations of the right to consular relations under the Vienna Convention. Mexico v. United
States, 2003 WL 256903 (I.CJ.Jan. 21, 2003). That topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
100. The federal and state courts continue to apply procedural default rules to avoid addressing
claims based on international human fights law despite the decision of the International Court ofJustiee
in F.R.G. v. UnitedStates, 2001 ICJ 104. That case involved two brothers, sentenced to death by the state
ofArizona, notwithstanding the violation of their consular notification rights under the Vienna Convention.
The ICJ found that the United States, through the State of Arizona, had violated Article 36 of the
Convention, the rights of Germany, and the individual rights of the LiGrand brothers. Further, the IGJ
held that the application of rules of procedural default cannot be applied by the states or by the United
States to avoid application of treaty rights because the application prevented "the full effect from being
given to the purposes for which ights accordled under the article are intended." Id.
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III. POLITICAL HURDLES TO THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN STATE COURTS

In the vast majority of states in the United States, the men and
women who serve asjudges are elected to their offices. 0 ' In most states,
citizens are given the right to vote for judges, just as they are for
legislators, governors, and presidents. In those few states where the
citizens neither vote directly for judges nor decide whether to retain
them, judicial selections are generally made by executive or legislative
appointment and sitting judges are generally subject to periodic
legislative or executive approval. In only three states is the judiciary,
after appointment, granted quasi-life tenure0 2 without subsequent
review or retention. While all federal judges are appointed for life, the
congressional confirmation process is certainly not apolitical.
For the American electorate, then, and for some of those who seek the
office, judges are simply political candidates. It logically follows, that
03
judges who raise funds, campaign, and seek support from the voters
must also have political platforms that assert their beliefs and opinions
and make promises of conduct after election.'0 4 Political accountability
requires adherence to one's platform, fulfillment of one's promises, and
responsiveness to public sentiment.

101. SeeAMERIANJUDICATURE SO(;TYJU)ICAI.SI.EI-CION IN THE.STA*s' APPEIJAT ANI)
GENERAI .JURISI)ICTION COURTS, SUMMARY OF INITIAL SIl'II.;C'I'ION
ME.;THOD June 11,1996 re\ision)
(on file in the author's office and available firomthe AmcricanJudiaturc Society) ihereinafter AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETYI; Gcnald F. Ucimen, Cnxcodiles in theBathtub: Maintaining the Independence ql'State
Supreme Court" in the Era q'JudicialIditicalitation,72 NOTRi.E DAMr L. Ri.\. 1133, 1134, nn.6-7 (1997).
102. Judges ae: appointed until age 70 in Massalhucseit.s and New Hampshire, while in Rhode Island,
judges are appointed for life.
AMEIRIC(AN JUDICATURE SOCIE.'T, su/'anote 101, maailable at
http://ajs.org/js/MA.htm (Mass.); http://ajs.org/js/NH.htm (N.H.); and http://aijs.oig/js/RI.htm (R.I.).
103. It is true that judicial campaigns ac subject to restrictions set forth in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. These restrictions afli~ct fund-naising, advertising, and the content of campaigns and
subject violators to disLipline. Nonetheless, few judicial campaigns viewed firom the perspective of lay
citizens, appear any different fi-orn
standard political campaigns.
104. The Model Code olJudicial Conduct, discussed in the next section, restricts
a candidate's ability
to make promises of conduct in office. Justice Stevens once observed that "1;1]
campaign promise to be
'tough on crime' or to 'enrfie the death penalty' is evidence oF bias and should disqualify a candidate from
sitting in criminal cases." Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 3, 1996). The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently ruled that certain
restrictions on a judicial candidate's campaign conduct violate the candidate's right to frec speech
guaranteed under the First Amendment. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). For general
discussions ofF
the politicization of thejudiciary, seeStephen B. Bright, lditicalAttacks on theJudiciay: Can
'
JusticeBe DhoeAmid E/frrtrto Intimidateand Remoz Juodges lrm Qflieor UnpopularDeioou, 72 N.Y.U.L. R.v.
308 (1997); Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Kcenan,Judges and the lditics q'Deatl" Deciding Between the Bill
of Rights and theNext Electin in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L RI"V. 759 (1995); Gerald F. Uclman, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining theIndependence qf'State Supreme Court, in an Era qijuditial Politidzation, 72 NOrRI. DAMI."
L. REV. 1133 (1997).
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The politically correct, and astute, judicial platform, has long been
"tough on crime." Candidates compete to see who can amass the
toughest record on crime as a means of securing a seat on the bench. 5
Judges at every level have found it advantageous to voice their support
for capital punishment.
In a Supreme Court race in Nevada, for example, an incumbent
justice, supported by the state's attorney general, announced that he had
a "record of fighting crime," supported the death penalty, and "had
voted to uphold the death penalty 76 times."'0 6 In Alabama, an
appellatejudge campaigning for the state supreme court called upon the
court to set execution dates in cases in which habeas claims were
pending in federal courts.'07 A lawyer in Texas promising greater use
of the death penalty, as well as the harmless error and frivolous appeal
rules, successfully challenged an incumbent appellate judge who had
authored an unpopular opinion on capital punishment.'
Others
campaigning for judgeships emphasize their stance on capital
punishment and their "successes" in securing death sentences as
prosecutors. 09
Even thosejudges who do not face a vote by the citizens of their states
sense reason to appear in favor of capital punishment. In California, for
example, individuals who seek judicial appointments are reportedly
asked whether they personally favor the death penalty." 0 Governors in
other states have campaigned against justices, even some of their own
appointees, because of their decisions in capital cases.'

105. See, e.g., Btight & Keenan, supra note 104; Uclmen, supra note 104.
106. Nevius v. Warden, 944 P.2d 858 (Nev. 1977). In a percuriam opinion denying ielief'to a deathsentenced inmate who moved that thejustie be disqualified, the Nevada Supreme Court expressed their
viewpoint as lbllows: "gusticeYoungj was simply responding to an assertion, based on one case, that he
was soft on the death penalty and demonstrating to the electorate that the allcgation against him was
distorted .... Citing Ihis] record in upholding the death penalty was nothing more than showing that he
will enforce Nevada law in ain area veiy important to Nevada voters ....
Id. at 859. The dissenting
justice noted that "lilf the public praise and endorsement. .. by the attorney general were not enough in
itself,Justice Young's putting forth his 'record' of lighting crime mater than judging crime adds up,... to an
unacceptable appearance of bias in this case. Id. at 860-61 (Springer,J, dissenting) (emphasis added).
107. T. Hughes, 21ontiel Clludenges Courtl oSchedueEvecutions, MONT'GOME.RY, ALA. A)VERTISER, May
19, 1994, at 3B.
108. Jane Elliott & Richard Connelly, Alans/ielk The Stealth Candidate:His PastIsn't l'tl It Seems, TEN.
LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1.32. Mansfield defeated judge Charles F. Campbell, a twelve year veteran of the
court, who had authored the court's opinion reversing a capital conviction in Rodiguez v. State, 848 S.W.2d
141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) the year before. For a more detailed discussion ofJudge Mansfield and his
campaign, see Stephen Bright, Death in Texas, THE CHAMIPION,July 1999, at 16-26.
109. Bright & Keenan, supra note 104, at 781-84, 811-13.
110. Harriet Chiang, Dene Atneys Accuse Dazis q'Bias in Handing eat Judgeships S.F. CHRON., Feb.
21, 2000, aailable at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?filc=/chinicle/athincf/2000/02/21/
MN99490.DTL.
11I. Butt Hubbard & Ann Caralin, Angered over the Death Penally, aimm A.ssails Tzwo.fudtges: Colorado
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Judges who desire to move to a higher court at some point in their
career may shy away from politically sensitive decisions. As one United
States Supreme CourtJustice has observed "[t]he 'higher authority' to
whom present-day capital judges may be 'too responsive' is a political
climate in which judges who covet higher office-or who merely wish
judges-must constantly confess their fealty to the death
to remain
penalty ..... 11l2
Candidates for judicial office, who are seen as neutral, or "liberal" in
their view on crime and punishment rarely stand a chance in elections
(or appointments) for state judicial positions. Similarly, incumbent
judges who appear too fair, too forward-thinking in their views on crime
and capital punishment will often find themselves targeted by victim's
groups, opposing candidates, or members of the state legislative and
executive branches. Increasingly, incumbentjudges are unsuccessful in
their retention or re-election bids because of decisions they have
rendered in capital punishment cases or labels they have acquired, fairly
or unfairly."'
A more recent political dagger, but a serious one nonetheless, is the
categorization of ajudge or ajudicial candidate as an "activist." While
the tag is largely devoid of meaning, it is a label that seems to be
attached to judges whose cases involve social and political issues.
Scholars point out that until the middle of the twentieth century, most
court decisions involved the restriction of government rights, not the
creation of personal ones." 4 But it is equally true that the growing
frequency of court decisions often seen as "active" or "liberal" ones are
prompted by the sheer number of legislative acts, many of which involve
indefinite and difficult language, and the increased litigiousness of
American citizens. Congressional actions, and the creativity of modern
litigators, spawned by anxious citizens, have "propelled the courts into
an unaccustomed regulatory and quasi-legislative role. Both the pettiest
details and the broadest concepts of government have come within the
judicial ambit."'

15

H gh Courtjusticev' 'DiregardVtle of'People,' Former Gnenor Chatge, ROCKY MTN.N.IS, Ma. 12, 1994, at
in a rctcntion clcction largely orchestratcd by the governor
5A. The author was challenged and dcli:atcd

and the govcrnor's party. The governor promised to appoint only death pcnalty supportc.s tojudgeships.
Stephcn Bright, PoliticalAttacks on theJudiciuy, 80JulICAlTURE 165, 168-71 qan.-Fcb. 1997) (citingWade,
a replacementjudgepicked?, MENIPHIS COMM.:RCIAI.APPEAi., Aug. 3,
dertpolts a legal dilemma: Ho ist
Ihite's
1996, at AI).

112. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Steens, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
113. Biight & Kccnan, sipra note 104.
N.NDE;NCE9(1979).
A INDE
114. JUEI IR\ NG R. KAUiAN, CHII.IJN(;JUI)ICI.AI.

115. Id. at 13.
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No judge can sit passively by in the face of growing dockets
overflowing with complex litigation. The judge must manage the cases,
hear the cases, and rule on the cases. Once the ruling is made, thejudge
must enforce it, thereby requiring additional effort and activity on the
part of the judge. Notwithstanding these facts, judges who are labeled
as "activists" are similarly targeted, often successfully, for removal from
the bench."'
Judicial interpretations of state constitutions often provide rich fodder
for criticisms of sittingjudges. Twenty years ago,judges in Oregon and
California were attacked based on opinions that interpreted provisions
of state constitutions." 7 And within the last few years, supreme court
justices in Florida, Nebraska, and Wyoming, to name a few, have
suffered similar attacks, all as a result of interpreting provisions of state
constitutions. "'

In the present political climate, it is unrealistic to expect a state court
judge, subject to retention or reelection, to initiate the application of
international human rights law in a state court, in the absence of higher
state court or federal court precedent or a directive from another branch
of government. In the two state cases previously discussed in this
Article, the judges who accepted the applicability of the international
human rights law in the state court were distinctly in the minority." 9
The great majority of state courts and judges who have been faced with
the prospect of applying international treaties or customary
international law in the state courts have avoided the issue either by
asserting a procedural bar, a binding Senate reservation, or a federalism
rationale. 20
'
One might expect that appointed federal judges would assume the
necessary leadership role in applying international human rights law,
thereby providing at least persuasive authority, for use by state court
116. Bright & Keenan, sopra note 104; Uclman, supra note 104.
117. Justice Hans Linde in Oregon was subject to an attack based on his interpretations of the
Oregon Constitution. Ronald K. L. Collins, Hans Linde and His 1984judicial Elction: The Primagy, 70 OR.
L. RE-\. 747, 761 (1991). ChiefJustice Rose Byrd and two AssociateJustices, Joseph Grodin and Cruz
Reynozo, were unseated in California based largely on death penalty decisions and state constitution
interpretations. Gerald F. Uclmen, Califirnia)udicial Retention Elections, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 342
(1988).
118. See
genealyJennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Obsenations on the OverlappingSpheres q/
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 25 (1993).
119. Seetext accompanying supra notes 75-76, 95-96.
120. Many decisions about the application of international law are avoided by application of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's pmcedural bar provisions. For example, in Breard v.
.Veitherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D.Va. 1996), the federal district court procedurally defaulted
Breard's international law claims, determining that they had not been raised in state court and that Breard
failed to establish cause fbr the failure and actual prejudice resulting from the violation. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the findings. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618-19 (4th Cir. 1998).
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judges. This, however, is an unrealistic expectation and unlikely to be
fulfilled. The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a dearth
of leadership in this area, as is exemplified by their decision in a case
involving a foreign national, Angel Franscisco Breard. Breard was
sentenced to death by the Virginia state courts, which also denied his
appeals and his attempts to get collateral relief."'2 When he attempted
to raise an international law issue in the federal district court, he was
22
likewise unsuccessful.
While Breard was seeking relief in the American federal courts,
Paraguay was seeking relief in the international courts.
The
International Court ofJustice recognized that the impending execution
date would prohibit it from conducting an adequate hearing. It,
therefore, issued the following order:
The Court unanimously indicates the following measures: The
United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures
which it has taken in implementation of this Order.'
Five days after the International Court ofJustice issued its Order, on
the day of Breard's scheduled execution, the United States Supreme
Court issued a decision addressing, in a very limited fashion, some of
Breard's claims as well as claims raised by Paraguay in separate civil
lawsuits. 24 For purposes of this Article, only the briefest critique of the
Court's action is necessary.
Demonstrative of its penchant toward the avoidance of international
law issues, the Court somewhat incredulously described the
circumstances:
It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings
are pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to the court
121. Brea rd v. Commonwea th, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994) (allirmance ofdcath scntence by Virginia
Supreme Court); .Aetherlond, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (dismissal ofpetition fbrw rit of fIdentl habeas corpus), q/1'd,
Pruett, 134 F.3d 618. While all of the fedenal proccedings in Breard's case refer to the filing and dismissal
ofa state habeas petition, and the dismissal ofan appeal by the Virginia Supreme Court, the decision is not
cited and cannot be located, presumably because it was a dismissal of thc appeal.
122. Many authors have wriettn about the Breard decision and about the dcnaI Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the provisions ofwhich served as the procedurnd basis fbr the denial of Breard's
claims. See,e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics qfFearand Death. Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas

Corpus Claims, 77 N.Y.U. L. RrN. 699 (2002); Jefl'ey Kirchmcer, Another Place Byond Here: The DeatlhPenalty
A'oatnrium Movement in the United States, 73 U. Col.. L. Rr:\.. 1 (2002); Philippe J. Sands, The Future of
InltemtionalAdjuliciation,14 CONN.J. INT'IL. 1 (1999); Erik G. Luna & DouglasJ. Sylvester, BqyondBreard,

17 BERKr3XJ.IN'i, L. 147 (1999).
123. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Pana. v. U.S.), 1998 I.CJ. No.
248 (April 9, 1998).
124. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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earlier. Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions presented to it
on the basis of law. The Executive Branch, on the other hand, in
exercising its authority over foreign relations, may and in this case did,
utilize diplomatic discussion with Paraguay. Last night the Secretary
of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he
stay Breard's execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the
decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing
in our existing
2
case law allows us to make that choice for him.' 5
The dissentingjustices noted the existence of court rules that would have
given the Court ample opportunity-and ample time-to review the
case." 6 Instead, the Governor of Virginia declined the Court's
invitation and Breard was executed.
The political hurdles to the application of international human rights
law in state courts, then, exist not only due to the judicial selection
methods in most states, but also because of some judges' desires to curry
political favor, which might assist them in climbing the judicial ladder,
and other judges' desires to remain free from criticism for their
decisions. Consequently, judges in states that elect, as well as states that
appoint, and judges appointed to life tenure on the federal bench, may
nonetheless be expected to avoid initiating any application of
international human rights laws in capital cases in the United States.
IV. ETHICAL HURDLES TO THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN STATE COURTS

Judges also face ethical hurdles in the application of international
human rights law in the state courts. In every state,judges take oaths of
office to uphold the constitution of their state and of the United States.
To the extent a higher state or federal court has interpreted a
constitutional provision, those interpretations are binding on the judges
of the lower courts.
Assume, for example, that a Kentucky state court trial judge is asked
to stay an execution on the sole grounds that the Kentucky and United
States Constitutions disallow the execution of those who committed
capital offenses while juveniles. Given the present state of the law in
Kentucky and federal law, and the precedents of the Kentucky and
United States Supreme Courts, the trial judge would violate his or her
oath of office by making such a ruling.

125. Id. at 378.
126. Id. at 379-81 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (BreyerJ., dissenting) (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
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In addition to the oaths of office taken by those who assume the role
of state court judges, each state subscribes to rules ofjudicial conduct.
Judges who violate the ethical code for judges are subject to discipline,
including removal from office.
Most states have adoptedjudicial ethics codes based on the American
Bar Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, or some variation
thereof. The Code is divided into several canons, usually seven, that set
forth either mandatory or suggested rules pertaining to judicial conduct
on and off the bench.' 27 Although the order of the canons vary greatly
from state to state, the canons of each state generally address judicial
independence, competence, integrity, diligence, impartiality, and impropriety, as well as extra-judicial and political activities. The canons require, for example, thatjudges "uphold the integrity and independence
of the judiciary,"' 28 "avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all . . . activities,"' 20 and "perform the duties of office

impartially and diligently."' 0
Particularly relevant to this discussion, however, is the following
provision, usually codified in Canon 3. "Ajudge shall be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence in it."'' "Law" is defined to
include court rules, statutes, constitutional provisions, and "decisional
32
law." 1
A very good example of the limits that a judge's oath of office and
ethical obligations place on his or her personal opinions about the law
is present in the case of Ex parte Burgess."' Burgess was sentenced to
death by judge-override.' 4 On appeal, among other issues facing the
127. The ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct iswritten in mandatory terms. ABA MODEL. CODE
OFJUI)ICIAL CONDUCT(1998). Each canon begins with the words "[aj judge shall" or "shall not." Some

states, however, in addition to modifying specific standards within the Code, have phiased their canons in
terms of vhat judges "should" or "should not" do. A third category of suites, by far the smallest, has
differentiated between mandatory and pvcrferred canons requiring in some instances that judges "shall" or

"shall not" and, in other instances that judges "should" or "should not."
128. Id. at Canon 1. "An independent and honoirablejudiciary is indispensable to justice in our
socicty ....

Ajudge should ... observe high standards ofconduct so that the integrity and independence

of the judiciary may be preserved." Id.
129. Id. at Canon 2. "Ajudge shall ... conduct himself 19r her.scll] at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality ofthejudiciary .... Ajudge shall not allow
flmily, social, or other delationships to influencejudicial conduct orijudgment." Id. at (A), (B).
130. Id. at Canon 3.
131. Id. at Canon 3 (B)(2).
132. Id. at Terminology 1101.
133. 811 So. 2d 617 (Ala. 2000).
134. The Alabama sentencing proccdurc, which provides fi a sennce recommendation by ajuty
with a final decision determination to be made by the judge, ALA. CO)E § 13 1A-5-47 (2002), was
eliminated by the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In the Burgess case
the jury had recommended 10-2 that the defendant, who was 16 at the time of the capital crime, be
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Evparte Burgess, 811 So. 2d 617, 629 (Ala. 2000).
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Alabama Supreme Court was whether the execution of one who was a
juvenile at the time of the crime would violate international human
rights law. In a per curiam decision, the court reiterated a prior holding
and concluded "that the death penalty can legally be imposed upon a
16-year-old charged with a capital offense.""
Concurring in the affirmation of guilt, but voting to reverse the death
sentence, wasJustice Houston. Justice Houston's opinion may be read
as expressing frustration with the conflict between a treaty provision
disallowing the execution of juveniles ("The United States Supreme
Court binds me as a Supreme CourtJustice of the State of Alabama to
abide by the ICCPR . . and not to impose the sentence of
death.. . .")"'and the duties of a state courtjudge in a federalist system

("I infer that the United States Supreme Court indicated that [the
Senate's reservation removes the ICCPR prohibition in State
courts] .... 3)).'7 It may also be read as recognizing the difference in a

judge's personal interpretation of a contested legal issue ("I am not
persuaded that the Senate's reservation ... frees me as a state justice...
from the treaty's restriction against the imposition of a sentence of death
for a crime committed by a person below the age of 18 years.")'38 and
a judge's ethical duty to apply a different interpretation made by a
higher court ("Even though I am not persuaded that the Senate's
reservation removes the ICCPR prohibition in State courts, I infer that
the United States Supreme Court indicated that it did.")." 9 In the end,
the justice's personal ethical conflict is obvious: "I pray that in
[concurring in upholding the sentence of death] I am not committing
'an unforgivable act.""'
Justice Houston's personal-judicial conflict was resolved in favor of his
promise to "uphold the Constitutions of the United States and of the
State of Alabama" and his ethical obligation to "be faithful in the
law." 4' As ajustice of a state supreme court, he was obligated to follow

135. EvparteBurgess, 811 So. 2d at 629 (citing Evprnle Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000)).
136. EvparteBurgess, 811 So. 2d at 631 (Houston,J, concurring in result).
137. Id. at 632 (Houston,J, concurring in result).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 632 (Houston,J, concurring in result).
140. Id. In both ofhis concurrences,Justice Houston confessed to having read Clarence Darrow's
closing argument in the case of Uzopold and Lioeb before voting and to have wondered:
[il we arc turning our faces backward toward the barbarism which once possessed the
world. If Your Honor can hang a boy of eighteen, some other judge can hang him at
seventeen, or sixteen, or fourteen. Someday ... men would look back upon this its a
barbarous age which deliberately t itself in the way of progress, humanity and sympathy,
and committed an unforgvable act.
Id. (quoting CLARENCE DARRO\V, A'ORNEX FOR THE DAMNED 82 (Arthur Weinberg ed. 1957)).
141. ALA. CONST. § 279 (oath of office forjudges); MODELCODE. OFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon
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the interpretation of the United States Constitution adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. Neither his personal opinions nor his
own inconsistent legal interpretation of the United
States Constitution
4
justified his failure to 'be faithful in the law."1
V. ARGUMENTS TO SCALE THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL
HURDLES TO THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN STATE COURTS

This Article has discussed, in the previous sections, legal, political,
and ethical hurdles to the application of international human rights laws
in state courts, often against the backdrop of a recent state capital
punishment case. This section will identify some methods for scaling the
hurdles, and will then use state court decisions to illustrate those
methods.
A. Federalismas a Solution, not the Problem
As at least one state court justice has recognized, the concept of
federalism not only provides states sovereignty in state-law matters, it
also requires state-court deference to some federal authority, notably the
United States Constitution and treaties that are the "Supreme law of the
land."'14 When the United States ratifies a treaty, that treaty becomes
the "Supreme law of the land," which must be applied in state courts as
well as federal courts. When the Senate ratifies a treaty, thereby making
it the "Supreme law of the land," yet attempts to modify certain
provisions of the treaty by attaching reservations, the treaty does not lose
its status as "Supreme" for four reasons.
1. Rules of Treaty Interpretation Support Application
Very often, the treaties to which the Senate has attached reservations
specifically disallow a reservation that is incompatible with the terms
and provisions of the treaty. In addition, well-established rules

3 (1972) (ethics code).
142. The uncertain aspect ofJustice Houston's decision, however, was his decision to read the
Supreme Court's denial ofccrtionari in Domingus as a statement by the Court that the Senate reservation
removed the ICCPR prohibition against the execution of those who are convicted ofcapital offenses while
juveniles. SeeEvxpartBurgefs, 811 So. 2d at 630 (Houston,J, concurring); EqlmrtePresso, 770 So. 2d at 150
(Houston,J., concurring).
143. Treaty pmvisions aie "equal in status to congressional legislation, and, as expressly prosided in
the text of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at § 6.6.
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regarding the interpretations of treaties disallow reservations that are
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." 4 The
international treaty that governs treaty interpretations, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, provides specifically that a nationstate "may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding
to an international treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the

reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."143
While the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention,
State Department protocol accepts it as the authoritative guide to treaty
interpretation. 146 As a result, the American Law Institute in setting forth
the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations has recited the
principles of the Vienna Convention. 141 Customary international law
provides similarly that signatory nations cannot invalidate their
agreements by the attachment of reservations that disembowel the
treaty's provisions.141

Given the clearly established law that incompatible treaty reservations
are invalid, the remaining question is whether the Senate reservation to
a specific treaty was compatible or incompatible with the treaty's objects
and purposes. In evaluating the reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, one need only look
to Article 6 for its stated purpose: "the right to life." An express
limitation of the treaty is the prohibition against death sentences for
crimes committed byjuveniles. The Senate reservation that purports to
reserve the "right... to impose capital punishment on any person...
including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age,"'' 49 is clearly incompatible with the object and

purpose of the treaty. 150

144. See supra note 68.
145. VIENNA CON\ENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 8 I.L.M. 679 art. 19(c). The Vienna
Convention also provides that "[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty... subject to ratification, acceptance, orapproval, until
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty .... " Id. at art. 18.
146. RESTrATEMEN" (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW OFTHE U.S. pt. 3, Introductory Note.
The Department of State, noted in a transmittal letter to the President, that "[ajlthough not yet in force,
the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and

practice." S. Exec. Doc. L., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) p.' (quoted in id.).
§ 313( I)(c);
147. Id.; RFSTATENIMX-F(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES%
seealso Maria Frankowksa, The Vienna Conzntion on the Lba of TreatiesBe/ire the United States COwrts, 28 VA.J.

IN T'L L. 281,286 (1988).
148.
149.
150.

Ri.STATEMEN" (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RIATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 313, Comments.
138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, § (2) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
It should also be noted that the express terms of Article 4.2 of the ICCPR provides that "no

derogation from Article 6 ... may be made under this provision." This provision further illustrates how
essential Article 6.5 regaxing the execution ofjuveniles is to the central purpose and object of the treaty.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4.2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
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2. Established Rules of Statutory Construction Support Application
Courts should apply well-established doctrines of statutory
construction in interpreting the treaties to uphold their purposes. The
first applicable doctrine of construction requires courts to maintain,
rather than destroy, the applicability of congressional acts.'-" "In
exercising its power to review the constitutionality of a legislative Act, a
federal court should act cautiously."' 2 If a statute is inconsistent with
the Constitution, however, the court is required to invalidate it only to
the extent necessary. 151 Courts should use this doctrine of severability
to sever incompatible congressional reservations from the treaty, so that
the remaining provisions remain viable.
The doctrine of severability, used frequently to uphold parts of
statutes, allows repugnant or inconsistent provisions to be severed from
a statute so that the statute continues to be valid. Specifically, if part of
a statute is void or unconstitutional, the remainder is not necessarily
invalid. Rather, it is the duty of a court to uphold the statute when it
can, and to invalidate only so much as is necessary to make the statute
consistent with the Constitution. "[W]henever an act of Congress
contains unobjectionable [separable] '' provisions,
[the court must]
4
maintain the act in so far as it is valid. I:1
The Supreme Court has applied the severability doctrine to treaties.
In a case involving a treaty negotiated between the nation and native
Americans, the Court upheld a treaty, but severed from it amendments
attached to the treaty and not communicated to the contracting parties
as part of the treaty. '15 The Court noted that "[t] here is something, too,
which shocks the conscience in the idea that a treaty can be put forth as
embodying the terms of an arrangement with a foreign power or an
Indian tribe, a material provision of which is unknown to one of the
contracting parties. . . ." 156

Two arguments against applying the severability doctrine to treaties
may arise. The first argument is that treaties, unlike statutes, do not
have explicit severability clauses.151 While it is true that statutes often

151. Robertson %.Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
152. Regan %'.
Time, 468 U.S. 641,652 (1984) (plurality opinion).
153. NOR.IANJ. SINGER, STATUTiE'S AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCI'ION 1 45.11 & 56.04 (6th ed.
2000).
154. Id. (quoting El Paso & N.E. Ry. Co. v. Gutienez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909)).
155. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898).
156. Id. at 23.
157. Nevada Supreme Court Justice Rose, who concuned in the decision to modify the death
sentence of Robert Paul Servin, a 16-year old at the time of his capital oflnsc, lists this as one of three
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include severability clauses not contained in treaties, the Supreme Court
has clearly held that "whatever relevance such an explicit clause might
have in creating a presumption of severability, the ultimate
determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence
of such a clause."' 58
An illustration of a response to this argument is provided, again, by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the
Covenant does not contain an express provision allowing severability,
it does contain an express provision disallowing amendments or
reservations to Article 6.:'9
The second argument is, perhaps, more formidable. The test that the
United States Supreme Court has set forth for determining the
appropriateness of severability is one that requires severability "[u] nless
it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
,,160
which are within its power, independently of that which is not ....
One might suggest that an attachment itself is convincing evidence that
Congress would not have ratified the treaty if it could not also limit its
application by the attachment. In reality, however, if a treaty's essential
purpose is undermined by the reservation, at best congressional intent
is inconsistent, for Congress has both endorsed the treaty, yet attempted
to undermine its very purpose with a reservation.
Some evidence suggests that the reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was made with knowledge that
it would be ineffective. When it adopted the Covenant, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee commented on the treaty's provisions
regarding the execution of those whose capital crimes were committed
while juveniles.' 6 ' The Committee "recognize[d] the importance of
adhering to international standard [s]" and noted that the trend by states
in disallowing execution of those whose crimes were committed as
juveniles might be "appropriate and necessary" "to bring
the United
62
States into full compliance at the international level."

arguments forupholding the Senate reservation to the ICCPR. Servin v. Nevada, 32 P.3d 1277, 1290
(Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) ("ITlhe ICCPR does not expressly prohibit reservations or make
reference to the object-and-purpose test.").
158. United States %.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585-86 n.27(1968) (citing numerous cases in which
severability was used to excise invalid statutory provisions despite the absence of any explicit seveability
provision).
159. See discussion supra note 98.
160. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp.
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
161.

U.S. SENATE COMM.ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE INT'L COVE.NANT ON CIVIL &

POITICAl. RIGHs, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) (found in Report, IV Committee Comments, at 3-4).
162. Id. at 650 (found in Report, Reservations 2, at 6-10).
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3. Customary International Law Supports Application
Customary international law is consistent with and supports the first
two reasons that treaties do not lose their "Supreme" quality as a result
of Congress's attachment of a reservation. Many respected international
scholars argue that in addition to interpretive rules, customary
international law may produce substantive rules that must be
followed. "3 Customary international law encompasses "the customs
and usages of civilized nations ....International law is part of our law
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination."" 4 The Restatement
concludes that "the customary law of human rights is part of the law of
the United States to be applied as such by state as well as federal
court."163
One such customary international law, "' urged by commentators and
some courts, is that individuals should not be executed for crimes they
committed while juveniles.' 6 7 Thus, they would argue that "an
emerging customary international law," supported by the majority of
nations and influencing many states prohibits the capital punishment of

6
juveniles. 8

163. RIEsTAEMEN'\THIRD)OFFOREIGNREI.ATIONSLAWV OFTHEU.S. § 102; HEINKIN,.nipra note
84, at 136; see also The Pasquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900) ("The law ofnations ... is paitl of the
law of the land.").
164. PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 700; see also RNSTATEMENIt (THIRI)) OFFORICIGN REIATIONS LAWv
OF'THE UNITED STATES § I 11,n.4 (1987) ("mattes arising under customary international law also arise
under 'the laws of the United States' since international law is 'part of our law' and is federal law").
165. RITATFMEN' (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 (1987).
166. Much has been written about customary international law, tests to determine whether an
international law norm has risen to the point ofbecoming "binding," and the effect
of binding international
norms. This discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
167. Koh, supra note 87, at 1835; F. Giba-Matthlews, Cusitmay nternationlLiwActs as Federa(lCmmon
Law in U.S. Courts,20FORDHAMINT'I.L.J. 1839, 1854 (1997); Ved Nanda, The UnitedStates Resenation if
the Ban on the Death Penaly./irrJuvenileQJinders: An Appraisal Under the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAuI.L. REV'. 1311, 1328-33 (1993); David Weissbrodt, Execution qfjuvenile Qffinders by the
United States Violates InternationalHuman Rights Law, 3 AM. UJ. INT''L & POtICY 339, 357-69 (1988); James
F. Harman, "Unusual Punishment":The DomesticEffects qflnternationalAinmv Re tricting the Application ql/the Death
PenalOv, 52 U. CIN. L. Rev. 655, 669-82 (1983).
168. Nanda, supra note 167, at 1328. Supporters point also to Article 37 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which was nitified by all but two of 193 nation-states and signed, but not natified by
the United States. The two non.ralifying nation-states arc Somalia and the United States. Article 37
prohibits the execution of ju\enile capital offcndeis. Two other treaties that the United States has either
signed or ratified also prohibit such executions. American Convention on Human Rights, Chapter II, art.
4, 5 (signed but not ratified); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Conven tion)(nstilied).
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An example of this approach of using international law as binding
common law was outlined by Nevada Supreme Court Justice Rose in
his concurring opinion in Servin v. State.169 Among the reasons why
Justice Rose voted to modify Servin's death sentence to two life
sentences without the possibility of parole was his acceptance of the
argument that "assessing the death penalty upon juveniles violates an
international customary law norm."' 7
4. Separation of Powers Supports Application
The fourth reason that the Senate's reservations should not eviscerate
state court application of international human rights law is a function of
both federalism and the separation of powers. A ratified treaty is, in
effect, a legislative enactment. When Congress passes a legislative
enactment that provides rights, and then in a separate provision removes
those rights, courts have no difficulty in exercising their authority of
judicial review to evaluate the legislative action. Courts should do no
less when the rights that Congress creates and then abolishes are
bestowed by treaties.
B. SeparationofPowers as a Solution, Not a Problem
Thus, in an appropriate exercise of judicial power, the power of
judicial review, courts should not hesitate to declare the reservations
attached by Congress to be in derogation of or beyond congressional
authority. This 'judicial review" of legislative decision-making is firmly
established in the American judicial system. It is just as applicable to
congressional adoption of international law as it is to congressional
enactment of domestic law.
C. Independent State Grounds as a Solution, Not a Problem
Despite political concerns, state courts may also apply international
human rights law in state cases by finding that those rights are required
by state law or by the state constitution. State constitutions are, in effect,
an agreement between the state's governing branches and the state's

169. 32 P.3d 1277, 1290 (Rosc,J., concurring).
170. Id. at 1291 (Rosc,J, concurring).
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citizens.' 7 ' State courts must consult state constitutions because they are
the essential statement of state rights and responsibilities.'72
In interpreting a state constitution, 71 generally, the question is what
the state constitution intended for its citizens."' The interpretation of
the federal constitution by the United States Supreme Court may
provide guidance, but it is not controlling. 7 - To consider it so, would
render state constitutions a "mere row of shadows" denying them the
important role they should play in the adjudication of important
constitutional rights.76

Some state constitutions refer specifically to United States treaties as
binding law in the state. When the application of international human
rights law under a treaty is raised in those states, state court judges may
frame their decision in terms of state constitutional law, thereby
insulating the decision from federal court modification. In those state
constitutions that do not specifically reference the supremacy of federal
treaties, the same effect may be accomplished by basing the application
of the treaty rights on state, rather than federal, constitutional principles.

171. Shepard, supra note 34, at 1553.
172. Id. "Ifstatecourts IIi to consider Ithe sute constitution Ias 'valid,' theyare sayingas well that
their own authority is not valid .... The assertion that state constitutions are no longer meaningful...
appears . . . to be ludicrous." Id. The author of this statement was at the time of the writing the Chief
Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.
173. For a discussion of the methods by which state courts apply their own constitutions, a topic
beyond the scope of this Article, seeRobert F. Williams, In the Glire/tllheSupremie Court CntinuingA1ethdooV
and Legitimaty Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRightv Adjudicaiton, 72 NOIRE DAM. L. RE.X\.1015
(1997).
174. Justice Hans A. Linde of the Oregon Supr-eme Court, for example, has suggested that "[tIhe
right question is not whether a state's guanratee is the same as or broader than its fedenal counterpart as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question iswhat the sute's guarantee means and how it
applies to the case at hand." Hans A. Linde, EPluribus-Constitutional Theoy andStale Court, 18 GA. L. RE..
165, 179 (1984).
175. The United States Supr-eme Court's interpretations have been described by one state supreme
court justice as
valuable sources of wisdom ... But although that Court may be a polestar that guides us as
we navigate the Istatel Constitution, we bear- ultimate responsibility for the sal passage of
our ship. Our eyes must not be so fixed on that star that we risk the welfare of our
passengers on the shoals of constitutional doctrine.
State v. Hempcle, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (NJ. 1990).
176. Justice Souter, while a state supreme court justice in New Hampshire, observed:
It isthe need ofesery appellate court fbr the participation of the bar in the process oftrying
to think sensibly and comprehensivcly about the questions that thejudicial power has been
established to answer. Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State constitutional
law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have already been decided under
the National Constitution. If wc place too much reliance on federl precedent we will
render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will rendcr State
practice incoherent. Ifwe are going to steer between these two extremes, we will have to
insist on developed advocacy firom those who bring the cases before us.
State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Soutcr,J., concurring).
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Thus, for example, a state court faced with the issue of whether the
violation of Vienna Convention rights has an effect on a state-court
prosecution, can analyze the issue in terms of the state, rather than the
federal, due process clause.
An illustration of a court construing its nation's due process clause to
incorporate standards that disallowed a death sentence while petitions
were pending before the United Nations Human Rights Commission'77
is found in a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
In Thomas and Hilairev. Baptiste,'78 the Privy Council was called upon to
interpret the "due process of law" clause in the Constitution of Trinidad
and Tobago. Relating the history of the clause and noting that the
"expressions mean different things to different ages," the Council
concluded that "due process of law is a compendious expression in
which the word 'law' invokes the concept of the rule of law itself and the
universally accepted standards of justice observed by civilized nations
which observe the rule of law."' 79
Other states have specific provisions in their death penalty statutes
that require the state appellate court to make an independent
determination as to whether the death penalty is "disproportionate,"
"nonarbitrary," or "excessive."'' 0 State appellate courts, in applying
state law, are free to utilize international treaty provisions and
customary international law in making those assessments. "1
A recent state court decision illustrates the application of this strategy.
In Valdez v. State,' the Oklahoma state court was asked to grant relief
to an inmate sentenced to death who had been denied his consular
notification rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
After Valdez's trial, conviction, and death sentence, the Mexican
officials were notified about his case by a relative. They became
involved and assisted in developing mitigating evidence that was

177. The Council described the argument as based on the "general right accorded to all litigants not
to have the outcome ofany pending appellate or other legal-process pre-empted by executive action." Id.
at 8.
178. Pri\y Council of Appeal No. 60 of 1998 (Jan. 27, 1999).
179. Id. at 6.
180. For a review ofeach state's laws regarding appellate review of the death sentence, see Penny
White, Can LightningSike Twice? Obligatims fSlate Courts qiter Pulley v. Harris, 70 COL. L. RE.'. 815, 84150 (1999).
181. The United States Supreme Court's assessment has varied as to whethcr international norms
arc relevant to determining the appropriateness of capital punishment under the federal constitution. For
example, in the Stan/ird case, Justice Scalia wrote that "American conceptions of decency . . . are
dispositisc." More recently, however, the Ains' majority noted that "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty fbr crimes committed by mentally retarded oflinders isoverwhelmingly
disapproved." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 n.21 (2002).
182. 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
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presented to the Oklahoma Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Board
recommended clemency, but the governor rejected the recommendation
stating that he did not believe that the international law violation had
a "prejudicial effect on the jury's determination of guilt and sentence."" 3
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in addressing the second
post conviction petition filed by Valdez, recognized the potential
barriers to the claim. Valdez had failed to raise the issue as required by
state procedural law." 4 The United States Supreme Court had let stand
a state court decision finding procedural default in almost identical
circumstances 1)and had held that the rule of procedural default
applied to federal constitutional violations. 8 6 The state appellate court
would violate principles of federalism and supremacy if it gave primacy
to a decision of an international tribunal over a conflicting United States
Supreme Court decision. 7
Strict adherence to principles of federalism and concern for
interference with the country's foreign relations, however, did not
prohibit the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from drawing upon
its state law to grant relief, at least in the form of a fair and informed
sentencing. 188

[T]his Court cannot have confidence in the jury's sentencing
determination and affirm its assessment ofa death sentence where the
jury was not presented with very significant and important evidence
bearing upon Petitioner's mental status and psyche at the time of the
crime. Absent the presentation of this evidence, we find there is a
reasonable probability that the sentencer might have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not

warrant death.... By our ruling today, this Court exercises its power
to grant relief when an error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a
constitutional or statutory right."'

183. Id. at n.7 (citing Exec. Order No. 2001-24 (July 20, 2001)).
184. Id. at 708-09. "The 1995 Amendments to the Capital Post-Conviction Procedure Act grcatly
circumscribed this Court's power Ito addiess issues not raised in prior pctitionsi."
185. Id. at 709.
186. Id.
187. "For this Court to decide the ICJ's ruling [in iGrandI overrules a binding decision ol the
United States Supreme Court and aflbrds a judicial iemedy to an individual for a violation of the
Convention would interfere with the nation's foreign althirs and run afoul of the U.S. Constitution." Id.
at 709.
188. The court noted important omissions in Valdez's trial. No evidence suggested that Valdez's
medical problems were known to trial or appellate counsel. Trial counsel was inexperienced, having never
bclre tried a capital case, and sought no financial resouices for invcstigation. Representatives of the state
failed in their duties to inform Valdez of his tight to consul notification. Id. at 710.
189. The court careully cited only Oklahoma law as authority fbr this point. Id. at 710-11. (citing
OKIA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1 (2001)).
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Sometimes it is the nonexistence rather than the existence of state
authority that forms the basis for a state court ruling applying
international legal standards. In the State of Washington, for example,
the legislature had not specifically authorized the execution ofjuveniles
who committed capital offenses. 9 ' Other statutes, however, potentially
allowed the execution of any person who was convicted of aggravated
murder, a result that would violate the federal Constitution for those
defendants fifteen years of age or younger. Recognizing its duty to
construe state statutes in a manner as to uphold their constitutionality,
the Washington Supreme Court imposed a ban on the execution of
those who commit capital crimes while juveniles.' 9 '
We cannot rewrite the juvenile court statute or the death penalty
statute to expressly preclude imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by persons who are under age 16 and thus exempt
from the death penalty under Thompson. Nor is there any provision in
either statute that could be severed in order to achieve that result.
The statutes therefore cannot be construed to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles.
Absent such authorization, appellant's death sentence cannot stand.192

D. Scaling Ethical and PoliticalHurdles
When a state court applies state law, albeit in a way that is
inconsistent with a federal court's application of federal law, no ethical
concerns are raised. The state judge is not violating the oath of office,
nor the judicial canon requiring faithfulness to the law. Thus, these
methods for scaling the legal hurdles to the application of international
human rights law in state courts do not impugn ethical obligations.
It is unfortunate that a similar observation cannot be made about the
political barriers. Judges who utilize state constitutional provisions to
190. Washington law included ajuvcnile transfer statute that allowed the prosecutor to tnanslir any
case to the adult court upon the finding of specified criteria, regardless ofthe age ofthe child. WASH. RI'.
CODE § 13.40.110(2)(1993). Additionally, Washington law imposed either a death sentence or a life
sentence without parole on persons convictcd of aggravated murder. Id. at 10.950.080. Read together,
the statute would allow the imposition of a death sentence on any juvenile, even those who could not
constitutionally be executed under the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanlrd . Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989).
191. Furman v.Sute, 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993).
192. I.at 1103 (citations omitted). The Washington legislature could act, but has not acted, to
overturn the decision by passing specific legislation authorizing executions for those sixteen or older. One
justice went beyond the ostensible statutory construction basis for the decision and stated bluntly "I believe

Washington should join the emerging national trend of legislatures recognizing that it is improper to
execute persons who were juveniles at the time the crime was committed." Id. (Utter,J., concurring).
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apply international human rights standards in state courts will be
criticized, sometimes brutally.' The majority of the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals was, for example, accused of "disregarding binding
authority, in order to assist a defendant in litigating issues already
decided or waived;" of "disregarding law to achieve a desired result in
a case;" and of "start[ing] down a slippery slope, which ultimately
fractures and decimates the Rule of Law."' 4 The majority responded
to this criticism in a manner that will hopefully become a guiding light
for other state court judges: fairness must in the end prevail. 5
Whatjustice can this Court guarantee and protect if it cannot correct
a Constitutional violation which is fundamentally unfair? The case
before us today is truly a "special case" where the interests ofjustice
and due process are genuinely implicated .... The concept of the

Rule of Law should not bind this Court so tightly as to require us to

193. No discussion of brutal criticism of judges would be complete without quotations From the
champion,Justice Scalia. In the most recent decision in which he disagreed with the maiority on a capital

punishment issue, Iarexample,Justice Scalia accused the majority ofdcciding the case based on "nothing
but the personal views of its membet.s." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,363 (2002) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
In Justice Scalia's words, the majority "argues," "pays lip service," "miraculously extracts," "setlsi its
righteous face," "thiashes about," "counts faulty," "talks empt, "throws one last factor into its grab bag
of reasons," and "attempts to bolster with embarrassingly feble evidence." For its efforts,Justice Scalia
awards the majority the "Prize fbrthe Court's Most Feeble Efllwt to fabricate .... Id. at 363-70.
194. Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (LumpingJ, concurring in part,
dissenting in part).

195. A reccnt example of political courage, albeit by a life-tcnured lideal.judge, can be fbund in the
case of United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Stipp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). In the earlier of the two decisionsJudge Rakolrdeemed it prudent to "give the Government...
the benefit of the Court's views" on the issue of the constitutionality of the fecial death penalty. Quinones,
196 F. Supp. 2d at 420. The view espoused by the judgc was:
We now know, in a way almost unthinkable even a decade ago, that our system of'criminal
all its protections, is sulliciently fIalliblc that innocent people are convicted of
.justice, fIr
capital crimes with some Frequency. Fortunately ...scientilic developments and other
innovative measures... may cnable us not only to prevent Future mistakes butalso to rectify
past ones ... but only if such persons are still alive to be ireleasd. If, instead, we .samction
execution, with full recognition that the probable result will be the state-sponsored death of'
a meaningful number of innocent people, have we not thereby deprived these people of the
process that is their due? Unless we accept ... that considerations of deterrence and
retribution can constitutionally justify the knowing execution of innocent persons, the
answer must be that the fedcrl death penalty is unconstitutional.

Id.
Judge Rakolriruled that the feden I death penalty was unconstitutional, noting, as hc did so, the wrath
he expected to Ibllow. "INjojudge has a monopoly on reason, and the Court fully expects its analysis to
be critically scrutinized." Qinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268. His prediction was not wrong. Weiser, .uopra
note 56.
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advocate the execution of one who has been denied a fundamentally
fair sentencing proceeding ....

196. Valdez v. Suite, 46 P.3d 703, 711 n.25 (Okia. Crim. App. 2002) (citations omitted). The dissent
retorted: "how does one disscnt to principles of fundamental fairness? .... What is'fundamental fairness'
to onejudgc may not be 'fundamental fairness' to another." Id. at 712 n.3.

